When it comes to myth, the student in any given discipline is apt to be in the position of the six blind men in the ancient Hindu fable who define the elephant according to the particular part each has happened to touch. My first goal in this essay is to cope with the whole elephant, to set the contributions of the various disciplines which study myth into significant relation withoneanothersoas toproduceaninterdisciplinaryoverview. The six blind men, however, apprehend a single, concrete object, whereas the student of "myth" confronts a concept which has been and still is the site of contending ideological constructions, many of them connected only quite problematically to any objective referent. 1 My second goal is therefore to make clear the extent to .which such constructions have shaped thinking about myth, often to the inhibition of interdisciplinary understanding. These two objectives, particularly in combination, require not merely synchronic but also diachronic explanation. As a consequence. much of the essay is cast as an historical "genealogy," in the sense derived from Nietzsche and made current by Michel Foucault. The history of the concept is not rehearsed for its own sake, but examined for its power to shed light upon the ideological constructions which bedevil the study of myth in our own time. This effort I By "modern," in my title, I mean the kind of thinking about myth which began, roughly, with the eighteenth century. Premodem thinking about the concept can be represented by Francis Bacon in the previous century. His work offers a dramatic instance of the divide between the old and the new conceptions of myth because he grasped the new without quite knowing that he had. On the one hand, when he speaks of what he considers to be myth, the mythology of classical antiquity, in his essay "On the Wisdom of the Ancients," he conceives of it in the two-millenia-old Neoplatonic tradition as allegorized fable, moral teaching concealed under the bait of fantasy (Bacon, XIII, 67-172). On the other hand, when he distinguishes in his New Organon
may be said to constitute the third goal of the essay, and my fourth and final one grows out of the third. In the last few pages, hoping that the prior genealogy has equipped me with at least one eye, however bleary, I advance another definition of the elephant and suggest how the construction of myth in modem anthropology might serve as a check on the various fonns of Romantic ideology which have otherwise dominated th~ field. the four genera of illusions which interfere with clear thinking, the idols of the tribe, the cave, the marketplace and the theater, he describes phenomena which characterize, when taken compositely, what many in our day would mean by myth (Bacon, vm, (76) (77) (78) . It does not occur to Bacon to associate the universal illusion-spinning of the race with the fables of the gods; this association, conclusive for the modern construction of myth, becomes current only in the next century.
The word "construction" in my title indicates that the meaning of a concept such as myth, is, like all meaning, culturally constructed, however "natural" it may appear within a given ideological context. We can see "myth" being cut out of whole cloth in the rourse of the eighteenth century. The French elas5icist, Marcel Detienne, suggests that the first systematic students of traditional story, in that century, reinvented Plato's concept of myth as part of their own war, analogous to his, against superstition. The historian of ideas, Frank Manuel, documented a generation ago in The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods the extent to which the foremost mythographers of the day consciously or unronsciously projected in their workcontemporaryconcernsabouttheoriginandnatureofreligion. Wecan see this tendency at work already in the first important modern es.say on "myth," thephilosophe, Jean Fontenelle' s "On the Origin of Fables," published in 1724 (though probably written in the 1690s). As Robert Richardson observes, Fontenelle tries out nearly every theory of myth known to the later century . 2 Two features of his syncretistic es.say, however, stamp itas modem in contradistinction to Bacon's. The first of these is his as5umption that the invention of fables is a constant of the human mind at a certain cultural level. Fontenelle, interested in the covert undermining of Christian revelation, regards this constant negatively; fables display, not "the wisdom of the ancients," but the perennial folly of human fantasy. ''Let us not look for anything in the fables except the history of the errors of the human mind (Fontenelle, 18) ." In order to demonstrate the universality of this condition he introduces the second . modern feature of the essay, its embryonic comparative method. Here, in the same year as Lafitau, who is so often credited in histories of anthropology with pioneering the method, Fontenelle deliberately compares Greek mythology with those reported from the New World, while Christian fable, (just as in Frazer's Golden Bough), hovers in the background as the shadowy, unmentionable third. This serond feature of the essayisareminderthattheriseofmodemmythographyiscontemporaneous with the appearance of anthropology itself.
Fontenelle'snegativeattitudetowardfablereflectshisownanti-religious agenda and represents the atheistic strain in Enlightenment thought But this strain became rapidly locked into dialectical conflict with its rontrary, the growing valoriz.ation of fable. Just as the century is marked both by mass 2 disClosure Fall 1991 THE MODERN CONSTRUCTION OF MYTH defections from Christian belief and by denunciations Qf the triviality of allegorized classical mythology, it displa~ a steady rise in ~ for ~ power of the human mind to construct for itself the tables of its own belief.
In a recent and brilliant encyclopedia article on French mythography of the eighteenth century, Jean Starobinsld sums up his findings with the epigrammatic remark ''In the intellectual history of the century, the sacraliz.ation of myth is strictly tnbutary to the humaniz.ation of the sacred (363)." If Fontenelle inaugurates and serves as an instance of the negative critique of fable, Vico, whose New Science was published only a year later, may be said to introduce and prefigure its positive affinnation. If one looks at Vico without wearing the spectacles designed for the purpose by various nineteenth and twentieth centwy Romantic interpreters, he appears, like Bacon, as an interestingly ambiguous and ambivalent transitional figure. On the one hand, his view of the civility of primeval humankind, thegiganti of his FirstAge,isasdarkasHobbes',andheshareswithFontenelleastadialtheory of metahistory acrording to which the race mercifully evolves toward civiliz.ed polish. On the other hand, once he achieved his radical insight that "the world of civil society was certainly made by men and ... its principles are to be found within the modifications of our own human mind," he felt compelled to recognize as a corollary that the humans of the Fll'St Age must have been "poets who spoke in poetical characters. This discovery, which is the master key of this Science, has cost us the persistent research of almost all our literary life, because with our civilized natures we cannot at all imagine and can understand only by great toil the poetic nature of the first men (21) (22) 96) ." It follows, as Vico says in his opening section on method, "that the first science to be learned should be mythology or the interpretation of fables" (33). Hence, in his Book Two, ''Poetic Wisdom," which occupies half his text and is certainly the heart of i~ Vico deduces the categories of this poetry of foundational representations. Thisdeductionincludes, under''Poetic Logic," his brilliant analysis, not appreciated fully until the middle of our own century,of the fourmaster-tropesof original language. Thus, as the instances of Fontenelle and Vico suggest, fable, or, as it came increasingly to be called in the next generation, myth,shuttleddialectically between being represented as an outmoded record of error and as the key to human continuity. From either point of view, however, it became the constructed Other of Enlightenment By a familiar irony of intellectual history, the Romantic reaction to Enlightenmentmerelyconsolidatedmythas theOtherofWestemsecularism. The ''humanization of the sacred" and its roncomitant "sacralization of myth" complete their apotheosis, and create the modem excitement about "myth," only with Romantic representations of the positive value of mythopoeia. It may be useful to distinguish in this Romantic valorizing of myth three moments, which I will call nostalgia, assertion and consolidation.
One can illustrate the first of these by focussing on Schiller's immensely influential articulation of a concept for which T. S. Eliot provided the definitive literary label when he produced his own version of it and called it "dissociation of sensibility." 3 The ancient Greeks were not like us, Schiller asserts in his essay "On Naive and Sentimental Poetry." Whereas we live in a modem, dissociated, "sentimental" condition of irony which undennines our powers of spontaneous belief, they lived in a "naive'' ro~tionof unified sensibility which enabled such belief. In his celebrated complementary poem, ''The Gods of Greece," Schiller's speaker exclaims in the first stanza, "wie ganz anders, anders war es da!", ''how wholly other, other was it there" (163). 4 The serendipitous theological associations which have since accrued to this phrase are perfectly appropriate in the context In the succeeding stanz.as the speaker elaborates on this assertion. There there was no gap between subject and object; truth and poetry were one. Poetry wrapped only a magical transparenceabotitthethingsignifiedand thesignified poured the fulness of life through the verbal construction. There what will never more be felt, the unity of consciousness withitsintended object, was felt; nature was the presence of gods. In contrast to this, the second half of the poem is one long cry that the physical frame of things is now an abandoned place, incapable of counterresponse, "entgottete," a word it is tempting to translate anachronistically as" demystified," or ,in Weber' skeyphrase, "disenchanted."
Schiller makes in clear in his essay that the unity of Greek imagination is the unity of unselfconscious simplicity. Modern humanity is truly superior to the ancients in the self-conscious quality of its affection for nature, but the price we pay is infinite longing for a state of rapport we cannot reclaim. One may beremindedofRousseau,agenerationearlier, stammeringparadoxically in his second Discourse about the original condition of man that it is "a state which no longer exists, which perhaps never existed, which probably never will exist, and yet about which it is neces.sary to have accurate notions" (34). I link Schiller with Rousseau here the better to suggest the relevance of Schiller's powerful and influential fiction to the rise of the modem social sciences. 'Thanks especially to some excellent recent work in the history of anthropology, it will not seem so farfetched to assert that this first, nostalgic momentofRomanticmythhashadapervasiveinfluenceinshapingWestern representations of the sacred among non-Western peoples. 5 This first moment of "nostalgia" ~wnes a West severed from a unified sensibility by nothing less than historical necessity; Schiller agrees implicitly with both Fontenelle and with Vico that the passage of the race into seHconscious separation from the cosmos was inevitable. But the second moment, the moment of high Romanticism proper, affirms that this fate can betransrendedbywayoftheindividual'svirtuallyinfinitepowertogenerate 4 disCloswe Fall 1991 THE MODERN CONSTRUCTION OF MYTH mythopoeia. A great deai of work has been done in the past twenty years to elucidate the seminal roles of German Idealist philosophy after Kant and of theGermanandEnglishRomanticsinestablishingthemodem ''humanistic'' notion of a substantial ego which is the originating source of value, prior to society and (all too often) beyond historical conditioning. 6 The moment of "assertion" in Romantic thinking about myth can be seen as a subset of this broader Romantic ideology. Doubly cut off from union with a society of believersand union with the cosmos, thecreativeindividualcan,nevertheless, evade the traps of a limiting rationality by both intuiting the pennanent truths embodied in past mythologies and perhaps even discovering or inventing the new one around which his or her own culture would at last cohere. (Notice the presupposition, which the Romantics inherited from Herder and popularized, that a mythology is a set of beliefs around which a "culture" coheres, while a "culture" (Herder's word) is a society organically unified by its mythology). .
One might consider as instances three works published coincidentally
in the year 1800. Schelling describes the epistemological mechanism bywhichmererationality could be evaded, namely· what has come to be called in literary history and theory "the Romantic symbol." He also initiates a project which w~ to occupy him for the rest of his long career, the development of a si:'rral philosophyofhistorycentered upon theevolutionofmyth. Totheessen~y backward-looking metahistorical theories of the eighteenth centwy, like Vico's or Schiller's, he adds a teleological dimension; just as a second age of "mythology'' mediated in the past between an initial age of "poetry'' (Viro' s ''First Age") and our present age of "science," so a ·new age of "mythology'' willmediatetheutopianreturnoftheracetoanewageof "poetry(374)." And in "Klingsohr' s Fairytale" in his novel Heinrich von Ofterdingen the visionary poet Novalis invents a famous fable, an "internalized quest-romance of the sort written in England by Blake and Shelley) in which the adventures of his heroine, Fable, represent the power of mythopoeia radically to renovate human consciousness. 1 The third moment of Romantic thinking about myth constitutes its entrenchment in nineteenth-century literary culture. It is marked especially by the widespread ensconcingof theRomanticsymbolandof the~~ption that the essence of myth is a permanent truth which transcends any particular historical vesture in which a story may be garbed. The Romantic concept of "symbol" is quite unlike the concept of it prevalent in the social sciences
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which derives from positivistic semiology. The Romantic version refers to a sign the sum of whose meaning, so to speak, is greater than any logical analysisofits parts. 8 This sign (for which James Joyce invented the relevantly religious name, "epiphany,") communicates to the person who apprehends ita directexperienceof transcendence. Coleridge, whosedescriptivedefinition of it is the best-known in English, says it is "characterized ... above all by the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal (151)." Nineteenth century aesthetics builds on· this foundation in ~g a~ to the core of ahistorical truth beneath traditional story. Hence Tennyson, in retelling the Arthurian matter of Britain, or Wagner in dramatising Norse mythology in his Ring cycle, assumes that his "symbolic" version enable insights which both transcend the limitations of particular historical settin~ and exceed whatever specific allegorical interpretations the work may inspire.
II
It would be difficult to overstate the impact of this Romantic ideology of myth upon both popular and scholarly conceptions of it right into our own day. In the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth, the literary theories I have been tracing thus far seem to mark time while fresh thinking about myth develops in the new modes of the human sciences, in sociology, anthropology and depth psychology. But these young disciplines themselves are affected by the wave of irrationalist thought current at the time, in the philosophies of Nietzsche and Bergson, for example, and the social thought of Pareto and Weber. These disciplines begin to exhibit their own versions of the Romantic ideology of myth, particularly in their focus upon the origins of religion and upon "the primitive." When Tylor helped to launchmodemanthropologywith the publication of Primitive Culture, he intended to support Comte' smetahistorical scheme, according to which religion belon~ only to the first stage of human development and the kind of religion which generates myth only to the first part of that. By devotingsomuchofhistexttomythandreligionheobviouslymeanttostrike a blow in the then-current "warfare of science and theology," but within a generation these lines of inquiry produce Fraz.er' s Golden Bough and the Cambridge Hellenists, Durkheim and Levy-Brohl, in all of whom one finds large elements of neo-Romantic irrationalism. 9
The work on myth in these new disciplines creates, in turn, a feedback loop into the aesthetics of Modernism The controversial MOMA exhibition of a few years ago, with its juxtapositions of "primitive" tribal art and celebrated Modernist pieces, was a reminder of the impact of the new theorizing upon the visual arts, and one has only to recall T. S. Eliot' srecourse to myth in The Waste lAnd, Joyce's in Ulysses, D Modernist art contributes little of theoretical importance to this ideology, but its brilliant successes, especially in combination with its appropriations of anthropology and depth psychology, stimulate, in their tum, a new outburst of theorizing about myth which peaks around the mid-century. In getting a grip on the extent of the survival of Romantic ideology in the twentieth century, it may be of help to consider its appearance under the four following groupings.
The first group, both chronologically and in order of importance, is Freudian psychoanalysis and its modification, Jungian analytic psychology. Hit seems odd to ciasmfy analytic psychology as merely a "modification" of psychoanalysis, that is because both Freudians and Jungians have found their political interest to lie in stres.5ing differences; with respect to their thinking about myth, however, resemblances and continuities are more significant. Freud's postulation that the mind is largely repressed and censored "primaryprocess" entailsasacorollarythatitislargely a mechanism for the production of mythopoesis. The persistent recurrence of comparable symbolism in both his patients and in worldwide storytelling led Freud, a belated follower of Lamarckian biology, to produce what he himself once called his "phylogenetic fantasy," that humankind inherits acquired symbolis~ including that derived from the origins of religion and the incest taboo in the slaying of the primal father. 11 In this work and in the later expansion of his theory of the instincts into a full-blown cultural critique, Freud constructs a powerful picture of the mind as dominated by mythic patterhsof inadvertent symbol. Jung, who was much more frankly under the sway of Roman tic poetry and philosophy, transmutes what he called Freud's "semiotic" reading of symbols as indicators of the etiology of individual neurosis into a "hermeneutic'' reading of symbols as signifiers of a universal process whose outcome for the individual possesses a teleological direction Qung, 1972, 291) . According to Jung's theory of libidinal development, mental health depends upon hermeneutical rapport with thesetranspersonal "archetypes" of "the collective unconscious."u Mystical as this theory sounds, it is reason itself compared to the debased versions of it peddled by Jungian epigones like Erich Neumann and Joseph Campbell, to say nothing of current gurus like James Hillman and Robert Bly. Thus psychoanalysis and analytic psychology pour into the twentieth century through a new channel the Romantic ideology of myth and symbol.
The second such channel is phenomenology of religion. This school of thought seems to have been jumpstarted by the remarkable su~ just after the First World War of Rudolph Otto's The Idea of the Holy. Otto employs the Robertson Smith-Durkheim distinction between the sacred and the profane in order to characterize the experience of "the holy." He thus evades the previous generations's obsession with origins, but the result is far from a neutral Husserlian account of what seems to be the case; instead, the method of phenomenology is employed to dramatiz.e the ontological reality of the object intended by the experience. While the best phenomenologists of religion, such as Pettazoni, van der Leeuw and Eliade, do not indulge in anything so crude, and test their categories in serious comparative studies, the gravamen of their expositions tend, like Otto's~ to affirm the truth of Romantic myth and symbol. Mircea Eliade' swell-known studies of sacred time and space are obvious cases in point 13 A student of myth soon discovers that in the United States, at least, departments of religion generate a considerable proportion of current mythography and that much of this work reflects the values and assumptions of this committed branch of phenomenology.
· The third channel of Romantic thought is the work primarily of literary scholars inspired to attempt comprehensive synthetic theories, both by the heady Hellenists and the subsequent "myth and ritual" branch of comparative mythology. It has long been a bit of a scandal that Frazer's work, so outmoded as mainstream anthropology, should continue to be revered in literary circles. Recent attention to Frazer by intellectual historians and historians of anthropology has helped to clarify this peculiar genealogy. Frazer appears as the inventor of a powerfully heueristic "comparative method," which, byoverridingthescxiallyproduced,historicallyconditioned representations of particular times and places, enables the transcendent subjects who are its practitioners to synthesiz.e the underlying universal meanings of myth. 15 Mythographers like Campbell and Frye do also rely on versions of the Romantic symbol, but they are probably best understood as transmitting Romantic ideology in this broader sense.
Last, but certainly not least, we find theories of myth a5 symbolic fonn, stemming from Ernest Cassirer' s Philosophy of Symbolic Fonns. According to Cassirer, following in part the earlier work of Lucien Levy-Bruhl, myth is a distinct modality of human thought, on a par with science, or even language itself. This theory clearly echoes the stadial metahistories of the Romantics and of Hegel and Comte and raises their familiar problems; to what degree, for instance, is "mythic thought," outmoded bytheevolutionof conscio~? Cassirer suggests ambiguously, as this Hegelian tradition has tended to do 8 disClosure Fall 1991 THE MODERN CONSTllVCl'ION Of' MYTH in the twentieth century, that the mode survives in art. This is a notion which encouraged certain New Critical literary theorists during the 40s and 50s to Cl$ume a fonnal analogy between a ritual and a work of art that enables the makertocaptureoreveninventa myth. Cassirer' s theory connects with New Critical thinking in yet another way, via Suzanne Langer who gaveCassirer' s "symbolic fonn" a lingi$tic tum in Philosophy in a New Key. New Critical theory insisted, in a striking development of Kantian aesthetics, that the essence of what distinguishes literature from non-literature must bea quality of language itself, and we find a theorist like Philip Wheelwright, for example, extending this quality of "intension" to the "mythic'' as well. For
Wheelwright, properly literary language is myth.
Thus far I have attempted to summari7.e the hegemony of Romantic assumptions in modern thinking about myth. But the history of this topic ever since the Enlightemrient is a history of dialectical alternations between what Hegel famously analyred in his Phenomenology of the Spirit as ''EnlightenmentandSuperstition"(561-589)orwhatHorkheimerandAdomo revealingly recast in the 1940s as ''Enlightenment and Myth." Even in the nineteenth century the Romantic glorification of myth as a means to transcendence, sacred or secular, provoked in opposition three major ''henneneutics of suspicion," those of Marx, Nietzsche arid Freud. 16 Marx's is the most exemplary, since it includes the articulation of the very concept of ideology. Ideology is, of course, a tenn at least as popularly abused and as contested these days as myth itself. 17 Since Marx did create its modern notoriety by applying it to what I have been calling "Romantic" and he called "German" ideology, perhaps it can be described provisionally here as the dialectical contrary of the Romantic claim that a mythology is a set of beliefs around which a culture coheres. View that assumption as true, but view it with hostile dread instea':i of nostalgic satisfaction, and you get ideology.
Unlike Marx, both Nietzsche and Freud also rontributed to the Romantic valorizing of "myth." Freud's contribution I have already discussed.
Nietzsche's lies in the impact 9f the early Birth ofTragedyupon the Cambridge Hellenists and Modernist writers by virtue of its pioneering, if rather lurid, insights into the prehistoric ritual foundations of Greek culture. But this Romantic strain, disproportionate to its occasion as it was, is far outweighed by Nietzsche's mature henneneutics of resenbnent, the way he has taught us to scan the dominant cultilral representations of Western humanist thought for signs of its will to power. So, too, Freud's renovation of the Romantic symbol is far outweighed by his henn.eneutics of desire, the way he has taught us to penetrate to the conflicts between libido and culture concealed beneath the structures of socializ.ed behavior.
In the past fifty years these three founding "hennene~tics of suspicion" have reappeared, aggrandized, in Frankfurt critical theory and in RETHINKING CONIFMPORARY MITHOWGIF.S poststructuralism. The effect of these critiques upon the concept of "myth" has been to expand it into a virtual synonym for ideology. Hence Roland Barthes conceives of "mythologies'' as semiotic distortions in popular culture and Jacques Derrida proposes a "mythologie blanche" inscri~ everywhere in the foundational metaphors of Western philosophy, to which we whites are nevertheless so blind that these tropes might as well be written in invisible ink. As a result of the rise of National Socialism in Germany Ernst Cassirer himself turns on myth, viewing with horror its reemergence in the modern West as atavistic political propaganda (Cas.5irer, 1946) . Even common language usage confirms this negative view of the concept; "myth" is ordinarily employed to signify a widely believed lie. When I remarked near the beginning of this essay that many tcxlay would identify myth with a composite of Bacon's four '~idols," it was this climate I had in mind. It would be misleading, however, to leave the impression that the valorizing of myth which is the legacy of Romanticism has been banished from the current field of cultural representatio~ low or high. We can confirm that the former is not the case by observing in virtually any bookstore these days the array of works by Joseph Cambell, usually located near the checkout counter. And the pressure of poststructuralistcritiquesof "essentialism" has produced impressively sophisticated counterresponses which take them into dialogue. Such theories are ronfident of the · constitutive power of language, like Hazard Adams' Philosophy of the Literary Symbolic, or the late work of Paul Ricoeur on a deferred but ultimately attainable symbolism of presence, or the literary theory of Eric Gould which finds the essence of what he finally names "mythidty'' in the endless play of language "in the gap between event and meaning'' (10). 18 In fact, although suspicion of myth is currently modish in academic circles, this suspicion is still locked, as it has been since the days of Hegel, in dialectical struggle with its adversary. I call the contest dialectical because the antithetical critiques of suspicio~ too, accept tacitly as the basis of their negation the humanistic or Romantic assumption that "myth" signifies nothing less broad and fundamental than the power of the human mind to ronstructmeaninginitsownrepresentations. m Perhaps one can best measure the presence even in twentieth-century thought of Romantic ideas about myth (and their antithetical counterparts) by contrasting them with the findings of modern anthropology. The greatest post-Romantic innovation in the study of myth has been the systematic study in the field of the actual religious beliefs and practices of preliterate peoples. Only after World War I and the great shift in intellectual fashion from focus on origins to focus on structures, did anthropology thus examine myth systematically outside the terms set by Romantic ideology. And the upshot . .
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disCloswe Fall 1991 THE MODERN CONSTRUCTION OF MY1'B of thisexaminationhas beenanincreasingronsensus that there is surprisingly little there. This is a hyperbolic way of saying that dominant trends in British and Americananthropologyhaveconduced tothedissolutionofmyth,regarded as a separate entity, in~ broader sociological CC?nsiderations. In British anthropology the varieties of what may for convenience be loosely labelled "functionalism" encouraged a Durkheimian identification of religion with social behavior. The ronsequences for our understanding of myth may be illustrated by Malinowski's historically important Frazer Lecture of 1926, ''Myth in Primitive Psychology," the same piece in which he marks his difference from Fraz.er by famously contrasting his openirir fieldwork with "the closed study of the theorist" (99). According to Malinowski, myth is neitherprimarilycognitive(as.Tylor and evenFraz.ersupposed),nor affective and "artistic" (asRomanticthoughtwouldhaveit),but"a pragmatic charter'' with indispensable quotidian functions: "it expresses, enhances and codifies belief; it safeguards and enforces morality; it vouches for the efficiency of ritual and contains practical rules for the guidance of man (101)." This same view of myth as pragmatic and quotidian pervades such classics of British functionalism as Evans-Pritchard' s work on the Azande and Nuer. No one could accuse Evans-Pritchard of neglecting the religion of the peoples he studied,oreventhetheoreticsof"primitivereligion,"yetheseldommentions myth and it nowhere appears as a significant topic in its own right. 19 Myth issubsumed,asitisinDurkheim,underritualbehavior,ontheonehand,and concepts of belief on the other. In the United States the influence of Franz Boas and his students produced a similar result bydifferentmeans. It may seem perverse to impute the elimination of myth~ a man who did so much. to promote the collection of Native American story and whose ethnographical masterpiece is called TsimshianMythology. Boas' employmentoftheword "mythology," introduces, however,a problematic central to my argument. Anyone who has examined his massive tome will know that it rontains scarcely two pages of what would pass in Romantic circles as myth; by Romantic standards, it is a compendium of folktales. The tripartite generic distinctions among "myth," '1egend" and "tale" given currency by the Grimm Brothers, and popularized by Victorian handbooks like Bulfinch, imply the full Romantic ideology; folktales are only miirchen,fairytales, whereasmythsarestoriesaboutdivinitieswhichronstitute significant fragments of the mythology around which a culture roheres. 20 Boas subverts this distinction by adopting a criterion derived from his native infonnants;mythsarestoriessetina stateof theworld beforethepresentone, while tales belong to time as we know it now. By this standard Boas is justified in calling "myth" a largemassofTsimshianstories which nineteenthcentury folklorists would.have called "tales." Boas' legacy of this distinction is a dangerous one, however, because it depends upon local definition.
Where his students did not find tribal corroboration they fell back upon whatever seemed to be the particular case. Hence Boas' ultimate impact on this feature of Native American ethnography has been the extension of the term "myth" to all traditional oral narrative.
Claude Levi-Stra~ provides a gocxi, if extreme, case in point. One might think of him casually as the person who has done more than anyone since Boas himself to stimulate the study of Amerindian myth. But a moment' sreflection will show that he hascarried Boas' positivisticdestruction of the Romantic categories of genre to one, at least of its logical ronclusions. Not only does he insist on the identity of myth and tale, but his canonical formula for myth also all~ws the derivation of ~e terms of its fonnal analogies, particularly the inverted fourth ~ from any semiological aspect of the culture, including rites, masks and body-painting. Any concept encoded semiologicallymayserveasa ''mytheme," then, once it is abstracted from narrative. It would be difficult to imagine a more severe reduction of humanist or Romanticclaimsformythas the special vehicle of transcendence than this dismissal of teller, audience, context and even~ itself on the grounds that myths are networks of mediating concepts that "operate in men's minds without their being aware of the fact" (Levi-Strauss, 1969, 12) .
Nor does the relative revival in the last twenty-five years of anthropological investigations of religion seem to offer any reversal of this unwillingne$ to hypostatiz.e "myth." For Gifford Geertz, as for ~t ~irer, myth is a mode of "significant symbol" on a par with language, art and ritual, but Geertz explicitly rejects Cassirer's "taking symbols to be identical with or 'constitutive of their referents" (a virtual definition of Romantic symbol) and does not mention myth at all in his "interpretive" studies of Javanese and Balinese religion (Geertz, 92). Studies of religion by the symbolist wing of anthropology, which generally views belief and practice as affective and non-logical, might be expected to be soft on myth.
But significant studies by Edmund Leach, Mary Douglas and Victor Turner in fact eschew it. Leach and Douglas focus instead upon the structural relations of symbol and Turner entirely upon ritual proces.5. 21 The roncept of "symbol" has acquired in the past two centuries an extremely vexed problematic of its own, in nlany respects parallel to that of myth and in some respectsoverlap~inrontrast to "the Romantic symbol," however, virtually the entire range of its usage in anthropology, as in the other social sciences, lies finnly within the positivist semantics descended from C. S. Pierce and well outside any truck with transcendence. Even a recent constructivist like Roy Wagner, who goes so far as to see "myth" along with ~hip systems and ritual as one of the ''basic frames of culture ... fonned as large-scale tropes," presents a wholly secular theory of the constitutive meaning of 12 disClosur~ Fall 1991 THE MODERN CONSTRUCTION OP MYTH symbols (129) . In short Romantic asmnnptions seldom appear even in the anthropological thought most sympathetic to myth. The severity of this reduction recalls Levi-Strauss' persuasive argument ~t the once potent concept of totemism is largely what Whitehead would call a fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Modern anthropology seeIM to have gone far toward establishing that the same is true of much that has passed as myth.
This anthropological shrinkage of swollen Romantic pretensions has much to teach everyone still minded to use the term "myth." Concreteness is fallacious only when located at the wrong level. Since we cannot expect either the word or the concept to disappear, "myth" had best be placed as precisely as possible. I believe our best recourse is to accept and build upon the anthropological demolition of the Romantic distinction between myth and tale. In the beginning is the tale. But how then, the reader may object, are we to understand Boas' discovery,sooftenrepeated,asitis by Malinowski in ''Myth in Primitive Psychology," that preliterate peoples themselves make this generic distinction? My answer is that either the ethnologists or their informants or both may have fallen into another fallacy of misplaced concretenes.5. There is a great deal of anthropological evidence that the realms of the sacred and~ profane, in terms of ~tive, as in terms of all other fonns of behavior, are distinguished not so much by modes as by moods. The existence of "sacred narrative," which I consider the best term for what Boas, following his informants, labelled "myth," is a widespread cultural fact. 22 But sacred narrative is merely tale, told in ritual circumstances and religious mood. This simplification may help explain why ethnologists so often disrover that the allegedly esoteric myth of a sotjety is the familiar, exoteric possession even of its women and children. 1be proper generic distinction lies, then, not between a genre called "myth" which channels transcendence and one called "tale" which is merely secular and mundane entertainment, but rather between tale which is employed in a religious context and tale which is not.
Thisclaimmustmeetasecond empirical objection, that sacred narratives are often much more than simple folktales; they are profound expressions of the matrix of assumptions basic toa particular culture. My reply is that sacred narrative begins in folktale but builds upon it; the religious mood in which such a tale is told guarantees that over time the tale will attract to itself a rich panoply of the culture's ideology. 23 This ethnologically-based distinction between myth and ideology helps explain both why poststructuralists and critical theorists have been tempted to identify the two, and why it is a mistake to do so. Tribal consciousness of the ideological freight of sacred story may also be an ancillary reason for the prevalence of indigenous distinctions between myth and tale. In any case, many anthropologists will undoubtedly continue to employ the now customary word "myth" to designate such sacred narrative. This is a practice hannl~ enough within circles where, as we have ~ myth and tale have come to be generally identified, but it is a practice which sows confusion outside the discipline, where victims of the RonKlll:tic ideology continue to ~d into the word more lurid implications.
Finally, the check to Romantic pretensions inherent in modern anthropological fieldwork needs to be brought to bear upon the kind of literary studies of myth which have been popular since Fraz.er and the succ~of Modernism in the arts. Studies like ''Mythic Patterns inSmeddle's Descent Into HelY' purport to discover or examine the quality of "mythidty'' in the literary productions of Western culture. I believe that the same account of myth which applies to preliterate cultures applies to outs; myth is tale elaborated ideologically. From this point of view the behavior of the modern scholar who produces such a study is the equivalent of one of Boas' Tsimshian writing a learned commentary which expatiates upon the ideology of his neighbor's recent retelling of a sacred narrative. This comparison indicates two respects in which the general rule requires qualification when applied to thatcuriousentitycalled ''Western culture;'' first, that by virtue of its long prehistoric development such tale is already heavily elaborated whenitentershistorical culture and, second, that '1iterature" isanincreasingly secularized analogue of sacred narrative. 1be German cultural historian Hans Blumenberg has in mind the first of these two qualifications when he distinguishes between the work of myth, in preliterate cultures, and work on myth in literate ones. Blumenberg' s extensive demonstrations of how such "work on myth" accumulates establish, in my opinion, that such "work" is really a branch of literary ciµusion. In order to acco. unt for the mysterious perennial appeal of certain myths, the stories of Oedipus or Prometheus for example, Blumenberg borrows from gestalt psychology the concept of Priignanz, "pregnance" or "imprintedness." But the peculiar attraction of such stories may be accounted for more simply, in keeping with the principle of Occam's razor, by what I have called ideological elaboration; the more intensively a tale has been worked into the fabric of a culture, the more likely it is to be worked further-and the more mysterious will seem the sources of its appeal. I do not mean to suggest that such internal elaboration of a culture's own myths is undesireable; it appears inevitable and may even be useful, as as would surely have been the case if a learned Tsimshian could have produced a commentary on the tales Boas collected. As I think the genealogy of the modem construction of myth demonstrates, however, what wouldbedesireableis thattheliterarypromoterof mythapproachitrecognizing that its special appeal is built upon its ideological entrenchment, rather than hoping to find there the Other of Western secularism, the route to religious transcendence, or the ground of the substantive self as synthesiz.er of truth.
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Notes 1 In order to avoid setting off "myth" in quotation marks each time it appears, I ask that the reader take for granted their implied presence in all uses of the term.
2 Feldman and Richardson, p. 10. Like everyone who has worlc.ed in the past twenty years on eighteenth century and Romantic mythography I owe much to the translations, notes and introductions in this distinguished anthology. 3 The best scholarly account of this topos of "dissociation" remains Kermode, pp. 139-161.
• Schiller published two versions of the poe~ the first in 1788, seven years before "On Naive and Sentimental Poetry" (1795) and the stronger, revised version which I use here in 1800, five years after the essay; thus the two versions of the poem neatly bracket the prose exposition.
5 I have in mind particularly Fabian, Stocking and Kuper. 6 I have been most directly affected, perhaps, by McGann, Lacoue-Labartheand Nancy and Bernstein. 7 For "internalized quest romance" see Bloom, Two excellent recent accounts of the Romantic symbol," both of which have seived as partial models for my history of myth, are Todorov and Adams. 9 This assertion may seem odd in the case of Frazer, who presents himself as a Tylorian rationalist and appears to maintain a "cognitive" position about the nature of magic and religion, but recent work on The Golden Bough as text unveils many of its neo-Romantic assumptions and helps account for its continued appeal in literary circles. See especially, in Manganaro, the editor's introduction, pp. 21-23 and the essays in the anthology's first section, ''Frazer: Textual Reevaluations," pp. 51-130. 10 The ethnographic significance of the MOMA exlubition of pp. ~, "'Primitivism' in 20th Century Art: Affinity of the TnDal and the Modem," is the subject of two recent lively studies; Oifford, pp. See Freud. Freud employed the phrase "phylogenetic fantasy" in a letter to Ferenczi in 1915, first printed in Jones an, p . 312). 12 By far the best text of Jung's for grasping his theory of libidinal development, and probably the most intellectually significant of his prolific career is his first, Transformations and Symbo~ of Libido (1912) , particularly as revised in 1952 and renamed Symbols of Transformation after he had articulated fully his concepts of "the collective unconscious" and "archetype." See Jung 1956. 13 I have in mind Eliade 1961 and 1963 rather than the later History of Religious
Ideas.
14 On the level of generalization attempted here it makes sense to link Campbell and Frye, but the association should not be taken to imply that their work is of equal value; Frye's bears seriously upon literary theory, as Campbell's does not. It should ~so be ~oted, with respect to my next sentence, that Frye explicitly dismisses Jung's collectiveunconscious" as "an unnecessaryhypothesisinliterarycriticism' (p.112).
The case for his being neverthel~ deeply influenced by Jung can be made only at length. 15 I wish tothankMarcM~ganaroforpermittingme~readaclarifyingportion of his manusaipt fortha>ming from Yale University Press, on the genealogy of this "'comparative method." 1 ' The label ~ermeneutics of suspicion"' for these modes of criticizing the dominant Western culture was invented by Paul Ricoeur. See Ria>elll' 1970, pp. 32-3.S. These "hermeneutics" wereprovoked,of rourse, byarongeriesof oven:letermined causes,notmerelybytheRomanticglorificationofm~howeverbroadlyunderstood.
17 It is employed in more than one sense in this very essay. There are numerous important studies of the roncept from various angles, but for useful general guides see Larrain, Geuss and F.agleton. 11 For Ricoeur's explicit acknowledgment that his later work on metaphor, interpretation theory and narrative depends upon a theological guarantee of meaning, see especially Riroeur 1970, pp. 494-5.Sl and Ricoeur 1978, pp. 223-238. 19 For Evans-Pritchard on "'primitive religio~" see 1965. In Evans-Pritchard 1956, for example, "'myth" is not even indexed. 20 The most useful survey of this tripartite Romantic distinction of genres is Bascom, although, as a folklorist, he is interested in refining and preserving the distinctions.
21 Brian Morris' excellent study provides a useful overview of recent work on religion by these and other significant anthropological thinkers . 22 I borrow the term "sacred narrative' from the title of the folklorist, Alan
Dundes' recent anthology of the theory of myt~ though he himself employs the phrase to characteriz.e myth as distinguished from tale (Dundes). 23 Many constructivist tlteories of language and symbol as constitutive of meaning, Adams' in literary theory and Wagner's in symbolic anthropology, for example, seem to converge to suggest this conception of how tale accumulates ideology. I have found particularly instructive, and promising for future studies of the process, Liszke's semiological study. 
